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INTRODUCTION
The framing of the move by governments to change the legal status of
marijuana and cannabis products is fundamentally imprecise, with negative
consequences for a nuanced understanding of the legal move at issue. With
the change in legal status, marijuana is not really being legalized or even
just decriminalized. It is being made regulatable or, to coin a phrase,
regulatabilized.1 Markets in illegal goods — along with the goods’

*

Professor of Law and Deputy Executive Director, Law & Economics Center, George
Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School; Non-Resident Scholar, Georgetown Center
for the Constitution.
1. For purposes of this Article, “regulatabilized” means being made subject to
regulation, particularly when it involves a change of status from something which remains
outside the purview and scope of regulation but because of a legal shift in status the activity
suddenly becomes subjected to regulation, or capable of being regulated within the eyes of
the law. It follows on the general use of the suffix “-ize.” See -ize, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
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creation, cultivation, distribution, taxation, sale, etc. — are controlled by
criminal law but not regulated per se. Indeed, they are not regulatable
because to do so would acknowledge the legitimacy of the activity. Thus,
for example, illegal marijuana grow operations are not subject to water
allocation rules, and the types or amounts of pesticides used are not
regulated by the environmental agencies. In the illicit markets, every
aspect of the production and supply chain events for marijuana happens
underground. If an inspector shows up, you are not looking at a National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit violation under the Clean
Water Act.2 Your problems are much bigger and different from the
application of regulatory law. Similarly, if you are running an illicit drug
house, zoning violations are not front of mind. Now, remove the illegality.
Suddenly, marijuana markets are operating in the great wide regulatory
open. You must dance with the regulatory labyrinth if you want to dance
with legal, and hence regulatable, Mary Jane,3 and must comply with every
last petty demand of the government and the costs associated with it. Illicit
drugs do not go through Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval,
nor are they subject to labeling laws. Remove illicitness, and suddenly
regulatability brings with it layers upon layers of compliance obligations.
From an economics perspective, the regulatabilization framing is key
because it puts front and center that we are not looking at the functional
dynamics between an illicit market and one that simply removes illicitness.
It is a move that introduces regulatableness. And with that, regulatory
costs are passed onto consumers through price. If regulatory costs are too
high, then illicit markets with lower-cost alternative goods emerge — or

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/-ize [https://perma.cc/8TTK-ZQRJ] (last
visited Feb 2, 2021). Examples of similar word usage that inspire this usage here include
criminalize, decriminalize, and legalize. Indeed, “regulatablization” is the best term for this
Article’s purposes because of the need to compare it with a discussion that characterizes the
change in legal status for marijuana as legalization or decriminalization of marijuana.
2. See NPDES Permit Basics, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-permit-basics
[https://perma.cc/9T7S-G3TY] (last visited Feb 2, 2021). See generally Christopher D.
Strunk & Mackenzie S. Schoonmaker, How Green Is the “Green Rush”? Recognizing the
Environmental Concerns Facing the Cannabis Industry, 21 VT. J. ENV’T. L. 506 (2020)
(describing the new layer of environmental regulations applying the legal cannabis that did
not apply when it was illegal).
3. “Mary Jane” is a street word, or code word, for marijuana. See MaryJane,
URBANDICTIONARY, https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=MaryJane [https://
perma.cc/MK6D-QHZQ] (last visited Feb. 1, 2022). As an astute reader might notice, the
sentence to which this footnote attaches and the one before also make allusions to lyrics in
Tom Petty songs, including his hits “Last Dance with Mary Jane” and “Into the Great Wide
Open.” See Lyrics for “Into the Great Wide Open” by Tom Petty and The Heartbreakers,
AZ LYRICS,
https://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/tompettyandtheheartbreakers/intothegreat
wideopen.html [https://perma.cc/DVG5-63XV] (last visited Feb. 2, 2022). Petty often
indirectly referenced marijuana in his song titles or lyrics. See, e.g., id.
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sustain themselves to the extent they are pre-existing. Many of the public
health, safety, taxation, and other benefits touted to flow from legalization
or decriminalization can be called into question when it is recognized that
we are dealing with regulatabilization and the concomitant effects on price.
That is, the continuation of an illicit market is almost guaranteed even with
the introduction of a legitimate market in marijuana cultivation,
distribution, use, and the like.
If illicit markets are attractive for both suppliers and consumers, they
will exist. Substantial economics research demonstrates this fact.4 Yet, the
pervasiveness of markets for illicit activity even in the face of a legal
market for the same activity is a regularly underappreciated and
misunderstood phenomena.5 As Jens Beckert, Professor of Sociology and
Director at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, and Matías
Dewey, a Senior Researcher at the same institute, explain: “Illegal markets
[including for drugs] have great economic significance, have relevant
social and political consequences, and shape economic and political
structures.”6 They continue by identifying the risk of blindness to these
facts: “Despite the importance of illegality in the economy, the field of
economic sociology unquestioningly accepts the premise that the
institutional structures and exchanges taking place in markets are lawabiding in nature.”7 Urban planners and other policymakers cannot pretend
or believe that simply making an industry like cannabis legal will
automatically make all cannabis activity law-abiding in nature, especially if
the costs of operating within the legal market are higher than the illicit
alternative.
This is all the more reason that an imprecise frame risks obscuring the
real costs and market limitations of an effective legalization or
decriminalization strategy.
Understanding these facts and drawing
attention to them with a regulatabilization frame will allow the discussion
to more realistically evaluate whether the legal move of opening the door to
legal markets in marijuana can accomplish its goals. It also allows the
policy debate to focus on how governments might encourage suppliers,
distributors, and consumers of marijuana by better explaining the benefits

4. See HENRY N. BUTLER, CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL & JOANNA SHEPHERD,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 103–04 (3rd ed. 2014). See generally Jens Beckert &
Matías Dewey, The Social Organization of Illegal Markets, in THE ARCHITECTURE OF
ILLEGAL MARKETS: TOWARDS AN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF ILLEGALITY IN THE ECONOMY 1–
34 (Jens Beckert & Matías Dewey eds., 2017).
5. See generally Beckert & Dewey, supra note 4.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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of operating in the lawful open and why they are worth the potentially
increased cost of doing business or purchasing product.
Part I gives a general background on the move away from illegality in
the states and the continuing prohibition at the federal level. Part II
explains the importance of framing to understanding the nature of any
problem, and it compares and contrasts traditional framing in terms of
legalization and decriminalization with the more accurate framing of
regulatabilization. Part III describes the differences between illicit
activities operating under a cover of darkness and open activities under the
umbrella of the regulatory state. It includes an analysis of types of
regulations that will apply to cannabis operations as a result of becoming
legal — including from the fields of land use, environmental regulation,
and pharmaceutical regulation, among others. Part IV explains price
systems in illicit versus legal markets and how this affects the incentives to
choose whether to engage in one or the other. Part IV also explains the
implications that regulatability, therefore, has on the likelihood of success
of a variety of claimed positive outcomes — claims which, to varying
degrees, rely on assumptions of little or no regulation of marijuana to reach
their conclusions regarding the benefits of eliminating illicitness. While
this Article does not conclude that these revelations necessarily counsel
against changing the legal status of marijuana, it does attempt to introduce
a greater level of realistic expectations of the regulatory landscape after
changing the legal status of marijuana and industries related to it, as well as
contributing a level of nuance and sophisticated understanding of what it
means to change that status.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE MOVE AWAY FROM ILLEGALITY OF CANNABIS
Political jurisdictions across the United States are moving to relax their
criminal treatment of cannabis and cannabis-related activities.8 Cannabis
law reform is occurring at some level in almost every state.9 No doubt,
8. For a recent update on the different types of state laws legalizing or decriminalizing
marijuana for either recreational us, medical use, or otherwise, see Michael Hartman,
Cannabis Overview,
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July 6, 2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/marijuana-overview.aspx
[https://perma.cc/RP2U-GFYA]. See also Gina K. Grimes & Morris C. Massey, Medical
Marijuana: Differences Among States’ Regulatory Frameworks and Land Use and Zoning
Regulations, PROB. & PROP., Nov./Dec. 2015, at 47; Robert A. Mikos, Marijuana Localism,
65 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 719, 719 (2015) (“More than twenty states have already legalized
marijuana for some purposes under state law, and the number is sure to grow.”); ANGELA
DILLS ET AL., CATO INST., THE EFFECTS OF STATE MARIJUANA LEGALIZATIONS: 2021 UPDATE
(2021), https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2021-01/PA908.pdf [https://perma.cc/
MRD5-F9V8].
9. See Sam Kamin, Marijuana Law Reform in 2020 and Beyond: Where We Are and
Where We’re Going, 43 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 883, 883–84 (2020).
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these changes have also required the adaptation of state and local
regulatory regimes now faced with the reality that, rather than treating
cannabis-related activities as criminal and outside the regulatory space,
they must find new ways to either fit existing regulations to now legitimate
activities10 or create new regulatory regimes for those no-longer-criminal
activities.11
Of course, at the federal level, cannabis products, their uses, and the
industries supporting them are still largely illegal, at least formally.12 The
Controlled Substances Act13 still considers marijuana a Schedule I drug,
and, therefore, federal law still prohibits the possession, importation,
distribution, and sale of marijuana.14 Nonetheless, the current U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) policy favors exercising discretionary power
against federal enforcement of federal law in states that have relaxed
marijuana laws.15 However, that DOJ policy does not change the statutory
determination of federal “illegality.”16
Beyond the simple federal
criminality, the fact that marijuana is still a Schedule I drug affects the
operation of all kinds of other federal laws. Notable examples have been
the inability for cannabis operations to contract with federally approved
banks17 and the failure to recognize federally protected intellectual property

10. See, e.g., Mikos, supra note 8, at 724 (“It is, of course, far too early to gauge the
impact of local marijuana regulations. But we do have more than one century worth of
experience with local alcohol regulations.”).
11. See, e.g., Grimes & Massey, supra note 8, at 46 (surveying marijuana-related
regulations like bans, limits on the number of dispensaries, restrictions on ownership, and
location restrictions); Patricia E. Salkin & Zachary Kansler, Medical Marijuana Meets
Zoning: Can You Grow, Sell, and Smoke That Here?, 62 PLAN. & ENV’T. L. 3, 6 n.8 (2010)
(surveying licensing and permitting requirements for marijuana land uses); Charles S.
Gascon, As More States Legalize Marijuana, Economics Comes into Play, FED. RSRV. BANK
ST. LOUIS (May 18, 2020), https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/firstquarter-2020/states-legalize-marijuana-economics [https://perma.cc/36HC-FK7T].
12. See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Introduction: Our Federalism on Drugs, in
MARIJUANA FEDERALISM: UNCLE SAM AND MARY JANE (Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2020).
13. See 21 U.S.C. § 812.
14. See id.
15. See, e.g., Memorandum from David Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., to all U.S. Att’ys
(Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/memorandum-selected-united-state-atto
rneys-investigations-and-prosecutions-states [https://perma.cc/6MFK-CLX3] (“provid[ing]
clarification and guidance to federal prosecutors in States that have enacted laws authorizing
the medical use of marijuana”).
16. See generally Zachary S. Price, Reliance on Nonenforcement, 58 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 937, 940–41 (2017).
17. See PETER CONTI-BROWN, PENN WHARTON PUB. POL’Y INITIATIVE, THE POLICY
BARRIERS TO MARIJUANA BANKING 4 (2018); see also Julie Andersen Hill, Banks,
Marijuana, and Federalism, 65 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 597, 597 (2015).
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rights for cannabis trademarks or plant patents.18 Recent years have seen a
variety of bills introduced in Congress to relax cannabis laws at the federal
level.19 Nonetheless, there is not yet strong optimism that federal reform
will be passed into federal law anytime soon.20
This Article will not focus on this schism between federal and state
law.21 Federal descheduling is on the menu of the current democratically
controlled Congress, with many allies from the Republican side yet with a
cool reception from the Biden Administration,22 and the analysis in this
Article will be a useful aid to that discussion. But this Article’s insights
also have independent relevance in the state debates as well. The point of
this Article is that legal status changes are important but must be viewed as
ushering in a new regulatory era for cannabis products, displacing any
romantic vision that legalization or decriminalization can be analyzed
without consideration of the effects of a regulatory web sticking to those
efforts.

18. See, e.g., Sam Kamin & Viva R. Moffat, Trademark Laundering, Useless Patents,
and Other IP Challenges for the Marijuana Industry, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 217, 220
(2016); Nicholas J. Landau & James W. Wright, Jr., Cannabis Patents, Trademarks, and
Other Forms of Intellectual Property Face Difficulties, 31 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 9, 9
(2019).
19. See, e.g., Richard Cowan, New Marijuana Decriminalization Effort Weighed in U.S.
House Report, REUTERS (Nov. 9, 2021, 5:40 AM), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/newmarijuana-decriminalization-effort-weighed-us-house-report-2021-11-08/
[https://perma.cc/F5LC-ADJJ]; Tiffany Kary, The Dose: A Republican Congresswoman’s
Formative Moment with Marijuana, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 22, 2021, 7:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2021-11-22/republican-nancy-mace-came-tocannabis-after-a-personal-tragedy [https://perma.cc/CE8G-MNDF]; Tiffany Kary & Steven
T. Dennis, Schumer Vows Action on Cannabis, but Major Hurdles in Way, BLOOMBERG
(July 14, 2021, 3:36 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-14/schumervows-action-on-cannabis-bill-but-major-hurdles-in-way [https://perma.cc/653T-3897].
20. See, e.g., Mike DeBonis, Democratic Divide Puts Congressional Action on
Marijuana in Doubt, WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/marijuana-democrats-legalize/2021/11/17/61dd37b4-47b311ec-95dc-5f2a96e00fa3_story.html [https://perma.cc/L4ND-DMJM].
21. For background on the tension and relationships between federal and state laws and
officials on cannabis, see Robert A. Mikos, The Evolving Federal Response to State
Marijuana Reforms, 26 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 4 (2020).
22. See John Hudak, Why Has President Biden Been Slow to Embrace Cannabis
Reform?, BROOKINGS INST. (May 24, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov
/2021/05/24/why-has-president-biden-been-slow-to-embrace-cannabis-reform/
[https://perma.cc/4F5D-VWQ8].

2022]

THE REGULATABILIZATION OF CANNABIS

525

II. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE “REGULATABILIZATION” FRAME FOR
APPRECIATING THE CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES OF
CANNABIS LAW REFORM
The labels typically chosen for the legal change affected by a relaxation
of our laws related to cannabis have been imprecise. The word
“legalization” creates a vision of a legal status change that simply lifts the
cloud of criminality without acknowledging the concomitant application of
an existing regulatory structure as a result of moving the activity out of the
shadows or underground and into the legitimate economy. The word
“legalization” also fails to capture the invitation such changes make for the
imposition of new regulatory structures. Indeed, advocates for legalization
often believed that everything that was happening in the illicit market could
continue as it was, with only the risk of criminal consequences changing
once the activity was deemed “legal.” Seldom do we see a recognition that
deeming cannabis legal means making it subject to regulation, indeed vast
regulation, like the rest of the activities in a modern-formal economy. The
word “decriminalization” has similar infirmities, although it was presented
as something seemingly less dramatic than “legalization” to make it more
saleable to the public. These labels created frames by which expectations
were set and around which debates were structured — by both advocates
and opponents.
How urban planners and other policymakers react to the move away
from illegality will undoubtedly be impacted by the framing chosen to
characterize that change. As Jamie Terence Kelly, Associate Professor of
Philosophy at Vassar College and an expert on the effects of linguistic
choices, summarizes in his book on framing: “Although there is still
disagreement about the specific nature of these behavioral rules, empirical
research has for some time now shown that the framing of decisions
reliably affects human decision making.”23
The injection of the
regulatability frame as an alternative lens by which the change can be
visualized could have dramatic effects on how governments and the public
perceive the change and how they choose to structure the governance
framework that will attach to cannabis activities.
Consumers of laws — in other words those who read, evaluate, are the
targets or beneficiaries of, or must comply with laws — reflect upon the
labels legislators or commentators give laws to decide how they feel about
those laws. There is a reason that most congressional legislation is given a
name designed to attract supporters and sellable to constituents — like the

23. JAMIE TERENCE KELLY, FRAMING DEMOCRACY: A BEHAVIORAL APPROACH
DEMOCRATIC THEORY 12 (Princeton Univ. Press 2012).

TO
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USA Patriot Act,24 Net Neutrality,25 the Affordable Care Act.26 Political
scientists Brian Schaffner and Patrick Sellers explain that “politicians
devote great attention and care to framing their messages to the public and
each other . . . . These crafted messages can significantly affect the
opinions and evaluations of target audiences.”27 Knowing this, politicians
and advocates for or against legal change regularly frame their
presentations of issues and actions.28
One very accessible example of contrasting labels in politics is in the
taxation of estates, where opponents to new taxation upon estates deploy
“Death Tax” as a preferred term to what others more gently call an “Estate
Tax” or “Inheritance Tax.” Studies have shown that this example of
labeling is, in fact, effective on citizen reaction. Brian Schaffner, a
Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts at
Amherst, and Mary Layton Atkinson, a Political Science Professor at the
University of North Carolina Charlotte, studied that very set of contrasts.
Their survey results showed that when the issue was framed as the death
tax, respondents believed more people were subject to it because we all will
die, even if we do not have much of an estate.29 What was significant to
those researchers was that their study not only showed that framing can
affect one’s support or opposition to an issue, something regularly
replicated in the literature, but the scholars also “document[ed] . . . an

24. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272.
25. See, e.g., California Internet Consumer Protection and Net Neutrality Act of 2018,
S.B. 822 (Cal. 2018).
26. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010).
27. Brian F. Schaffner & Patrick J. Sellers, Introduction, in WINNING WITH WORDS: THE
ORIGINS & IMPACT OF POLITICAL FRAMING 1, 1 (Brian F. Schaffner & Patrick J. Sellers eds.,
Routledge 2010).
28. As Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner explain:
We will witness the struggle again and again . . . . Is a federal court’s
desegregation order a “remedy for a constitutional violation” or is it “running the
public schools” []? Is the shift of population in the Atlanta suburbs sprawling
across DeKalb County a “natural demographic shift” or is it “white flight” []? As
we have already hinted, these are questions that bedevil not only Supreme Court
Justices, Presidents, and “spin doctors” — each from a vastly different
perspective.
ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 35 (2000).
29. See Brian F. Schaffner & Mary Layton Atkinson, Taxing Death or Estates? When
Frames Influence Citizens’ Issue Beliefs, in WINNING WITH WORDS: THE ORIGINS & IMPACT
OF POLITICAL FRAMING , supra note 27, at 121.
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effect in the debate over . . . the inheritance tax” where “frames can []
influence the public’s beliefs about the content of policy proposals.”30
This example is not isolated. James Druckman, Payson S. Wild
Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University, explains the
presence of competing labels and concomitantly competing frames across a
wide swath of political hot spots. He notes that “much of politics involves
battles over how a campaign, a problem, or an issue should be
understood;”31 and he continues by articulating several accessible examples
where framing is quite strategically employed to affect the way an issue is
viewed. These examples include the different phrases available to describe
topics of debate, “such as campaign finance (free speech or democratic
corruption?), abortion (rights of mother or rights of unborn child?), gun
control (right to bear arms or public safety?), affirmative action (reverse
discrimination or remedial action?), welfare policy (humanitarianism or
overspending?), [and] hate group rallies (free speech or public safety?),”
among others.32 Whether intentionally chosen or not, these labels to legal
instruments, movements, or legal changes can affect how communities,
urban planners, and government regulators react.
Our word choices matter not only for accurately describing the character
and consequences of the cannabis law reform debate but also for generating
an accurate picture of the legal landscape capable of being assessed by
observers trying to evaluate the likely effects of so-called legalization or
decriminalization. Diatram Scheufele, the John E. Ross Professor in
Science Communication and Vilas Distinguished Achievement Professor at
the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and Shanto Iyengar, the Chandler
Professor of Communication and Professor of Political Science at Stanford
University, explain in their co-authored article on these subjects that
“framing effects refer to behavioral or attitudinal outcomes that are not due
to differences in what is being communicated, but rather to variations in
how a given piece of information is being presented (or framed) in public
discourse.”33 Regulatabilization anchors the receptor of the word in the
concept of a regulated space rather than emphasizing concepts that fall
short of recognizing the regulatory overlay. Especially when we are
talking about a change in status away from illegality, legality and de-

30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. James N. Druckman, The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence,
23 POL. BEHAV. 225, 235 (2001) (“Most agree that emphasis framing effects also occur with
some regularity –– for example, Chong . . . explains that these types of framing effects
constitute ‘the essence of political opinion formation.’” (internal citation omitted)).
32. Id.
33. Dietram A. Scheufele & Shanto Iyengar, The State of Framing Research: A Call for
New Directions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 619 (2017).
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criminality focus only on the elimination of illegality. Regulatability
focuses on the more complex end result — a product and set of activities
formally unregulated because it was illegal is now subject to the full
umbrella of regulations that we apply to all aspects of the legitimate
economy.
The more precise regulatabilization frame could have several different
kinds of effects. Some skeptics of legalization or decriminalization may
find the regulatabilization frame comforting. To these individuals, a
reminder that the new cannabis market will be regulated may allay fears.
The regulatability frame may be welcomed because it makes the new
regime seem less like the unbound Wild West, making relaxing
prohibitions more acceptable to some otherwise opposing forces. To
others, the regulatability frame may seem like a scary acknowledgment of
the horrors to come from compliance obligations and associated costs. Still
further, the regulatability frame to some might just awaken them to the
need to evaluate the drivers of a continuing illicit market for cannabis as a
result of the costs associated with operating in the daylight of law. This
Article does not intend to evaluate which of these or other reactions are
more likely or more appropriate, nor is it necessary to resolve those
questions when the purpose of this Article is to make the limited contention
that the frame makes a difference. And, as Parts III and IV show, the frame
better prepares those evaluating cannabis law and policy for the
consequences that flow from a newly regulated market.
III. CATEGORIES OF REGULATION ATTACHING TO NON-ILLICIT
CANNABIS ACTIVITIES AND PRODUCTS
This Part describes the regulatory landscape that legal cannabis
industries must traverse. Note that this is new and foreign terrain for
cannabis operations. Prior to legalization, these operations had to only
concern themselves with avoiding getting caught rather than keeping
books, applying for permits, and adjusting behavior to comply with the
complex regulatory web. These are the costs of doing business attendant to
all legitimate, lawful businesses. There are three general categories of
regulation and taxation that will apply to legalized or decriminalized
cannabis, making them the more appropriate terminological choice to be
the regulatabilization of cannabis: (1) general laws and regulations
applicable to all legal activities and products, now encompassing cannabis
activities and products as well; (2) general and specific taxation provisions
applying to cannabis; and (3) specific cannabis-related regulation of
activities or products in cannabis markets, including regulations that
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amount to “soft prohibition,” i.e., means of using the regulatory process to
discourage cannabis business or cannabis consumption.34 Categories (2)
and (3) get a fair amount of attention in the cannabis literature, while
category (1) is regularly ignored. Yet, it is category (1) that is perhaps the
most consequential in terms of imposing regulatory costs on cannabis
operations and correspondingly raising the prices of legal cannabis
products by increasing compliance costs and raising the barriers to entry for
cannabis businesses.
A. Generally Applicable Laws and Regulations
Every legal activity and product in the formal market economy is subject
to generally applicable laws and regulations. In other words, if someone
operates in the legal economy then that individual is operating inside the
legal ecosystem with the goal of having their actions recognized as legal,
which necessarily means their actions must be judged for consistency and
compliance with that legal environment. Noncompliant action, or those
actions outside the strictures of laws and regulations, also by necessity then
gets deemed as extra-legal or illegal. From another vantage point, by the
nature of being illegal and operating in the shadows of informal markets,
almost every illegal activity is not subject to those same generally
applicable laws and regulations because they apply only to legal activity.
Thus, when you make illegal activity not illegal anymore, more happens
than just the removal of the cloth of illegality. What also happens is the
new layering of the cloth of regulatability. This is the true, more complete
story of making cannabis not illegal, or what many call cannabis
legalization or decriminalization.
Understanding this regulatabilization of cannabis as the better term for
the legal status change affected by removing cannabis illegality, we can
quickly begin to appreciate the vast layer of regulations and concomitant
regulatory and compliance costs that follow. This first Section focuses on
those regulations that treat cannabis-related activities like all other
activities in the formal market. It will be impossible to name all of the
regulations that begin to apply, but a few examples should demonstrate the
point.
After the move away from illegality, state and local regulators will now
be asked to consider how existing zoning rules apply to dispensaries, for
example. While the criminal seller never concerned herself with whether
the street corner or dorm room was zoned for commercial sales, the new

34. See generally Donald J. Kochan, Incumbent Landscapes, Disruptive Uses:
Perspectives on Marijuana-Related Land Use Control, 3 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. 35, 47
(2016).
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legal cannabis dispensary must do precisely that.35 Furthermore, cannabis
stores will need to be aware of and in compliance with health and safety
regulations. State and eventually federal workplace safety standards will
apply. Their employees will be protected by labor laws. They will need to
contribute payroll taxes, social security taxes, and workers’ compensation
funds for their employees.36 The local illicit dealer was not in the practice
of giving his crew a W-4 form.
Especially after federal descheduling, if that occurs, the federal drug
approval processes will need to be followed.37 This will dramatically affect
non-illegal cannabis operations. Calling it a legal drug necessarily means
the pharmaceutical components of cannabis are subject to approval and
conditions imposed by the FDA. Right now, federal FDA regulations
dominate the field and largely preempt state drug approval laws. This
means we have been in a quandary with state legalization but with no place
to get the drugs approved because of continued federal scheduling. Once
the federal government deschedules, marijuana could be deemed a drug,
that like all other legal drugs, must go through the rigors of the FDA
approval process.38 This example is a classic case of the net that comes
when a drug becomes non-illegal.
Consumer protection laws will govern the kinds of advertisements and
claims made about cannabis products. And, an added layer of product
safety considerations will become applicable, enforceable, and litigable,
creating significant compliance obligations. Prices will be scrutinized by
regulators, and concerns over antitrust or monopoly could eventually
emerge as some market consolidation occurs in the cannabis trade.
Land use and environmental laws will also come into play.39 Cannabis
agricultural operations use pesticides and engage in other activities
regulated under state and federal environmental laws. So too are chemicals
used in processing cannabis, making it necessary to comply with
regulations regarding the use and disposal of toxic substances.40 Costs

35. See id. at 39–40 (discussing the application of land use controls, including zoning, to
marijuana-based operations).
36. See Rochelle B. Spandorf, Who’s the Boss, L.A. LAW., Mar. 2011, at 18 (explaining
the general duties of lawful employers to employees).
37. See Sean M. O’Connor & Erika Lietzan, The Surprising Reach of FDA Regulation,
Even After Descheduling, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 823, 824 (2019).
38. On the rigors of the FDA regulatory process generally, see Christopher-Paul
Milne & Kenneth I. Kaitin, Are Regulation and Innovation Priorities Serving Public Health
Needs?, 10 FRONTIERS PHARMACOLOGY 144 (2019).
39. See Strunk & Schoonmaker, supra note 2.
40. See, e.g., Jodi Helmer, The Environmental Downside of Cannabis Cultivation,
JSTOR DAILY (June 18, 2019), https://daily.jstor.org/the-environmental-downside-ofcannabis-cultivation/ [https://perma.cc/R9HF-8WE8].
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must be incurred to contain against water pollution. In fact, studies show
that legalization of cannabis leads to more cultivation in urban areas and
hence new water pollution issues seeping into those urban environments.41
And grow operations are water intensive.42 This means that regulations
over water usage will apply to operations and significant transaction costs
will be incurred associated with identifying, buying, and sometimes,
litigating water rights for irrigation.43 The hidden fields of the illicit
markets did not have owners who went to court to litigate the scope of the
water rights they were using to irrigate their illegal plants.44
Like all legitimate businesses, cannabis businesses will need to get
licenses and file to operate as partnerships, LLCs, or corporations.
Businesses will need to file taxes, and individuals operating within the
industry will need to report income from their cannabis activities,45
whereas previously, it was an all-cash and keep-quiet illegal regime. Nondiscrimination provisions will apply to how dealers and really any business
owner operating within the cannabis industry may hire and fire. The list
could go on and on. Anything federal, state, or local government can do to
regulate businesses or transactions they can now do to regulate cannabis
activities once it is legalized. And, while most of the examples are state
ones because the general federal laws do not yet apply, in many of the
categories already listed there will be a federal regulatory component either
on top of or in coordination with state officials — such as when both the
Environmental Protection Agency and state environmental enforcement
officials become concerned with environmental hazards.
B. Taxation of Cannabis
Taxation of cannabis is a major part of the narrative behind efforts to
remove illegality.46 If you legalize it, you can track its sales and tax it. The
revenue generated can be used for all sorts of things deemed useful like

41. See Ariani C. Wartenberg et al., Cannabis and the Environment: What Science Tells
Us and What We Still Need to Know, 8 ENV’T. SCI. TECH. LETTERS 98, 100 (2021).
42. See id.
43. See Vanda Felbab-Brown, Pot, Water Theft, and Environmental Harms in the US
and Mexico, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 12, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2021/04/12/pot-and-water-theft-and-environmental-harms-in-the-us-and-mexico/
[https://perma.cc/9CNV-P6VW].
44. See id.
45. See De Lon Harris, Providing Resources to Help Cannabis Business Owners
Successfully Navigate Unique Tax Responsibilities, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Sept. 27,
2021), https://www.irs.gov/about-irs/providing-resources-to-help-cannabis-business-owners
-successfully-navigate-unique-tax-responsibilities [https://perma.cc/23VP-SY3W].
46. For a general discussion and background on taxation of marijuana, see generally
Benjamin M. Leff, Marijuana Taxation: Theory and Practice, 101 B.U. L. REV. 915 (2021).
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education, roads and infrastructure, public health services, law enforcement
or local fire department and other public services, and more. This is a
major selling point in the campaigns to change state marijuana laws. While
taxation and regulation generally can be considered two distinct categories
of governmental activity, for this Article’s purposes it is useful to lump
taxation in with regulation as each is imposing a cost of doing business
with crossover explanatory power for overhead’s impact on price.
States have applied general tax structures to marijuana sales, such as
state sales tax. And, they have constructed cannabis-specific taxation
levels, often designed with social engineering purposes in mind. Some
herald such taxation as a great way to reduce undesirable behavior. The
higher costs of a product once tax is added in will price some people out of
the market for that product; the tax disincentivizes purchasing the taxed
product. This may be a socially desirable result because we get fewer users
of the socially undesirable product. Yet, one of the pitfalls associated with
creating taxation strategies with such a goal in mind is that fewer purchases
also mean fewer collected taxes. And, if the system is also depending on
collecting lots of taxes from legalization, revenue generation and activity
deterrence goals work at cross purposes. If you are taxing a product hoping
to generate large revenues, then you want large sales. The higher the taxes,
the more likely you will discourage sales or drive individuals into the black
market.47 This strikes against the revenue generation goal, so the trick is to
set the taxation at the optimal level to maximize overall sales. Of course,
many advocates like the idea that taxes deter consumption and call for a
high tax rate not for revenue generation but activity deterrence. Of course,
this is incompatible with a revenue generation model of taxes. It also is
naïve in the sense that it assumes the absence of a black market substitute
for consumption of the same good an individual would have otherwise
consumed in the formal market if the tax level had not pushed them out of
it.
Solving the debate over these objectives and identifying the optimal tax
rate is beyond the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, it is critical that
taxation be understood as one of the costs not imposed on illicit operations
and one emerging only as a consequence of a legal shift to cannabis
becoming non-illegal.
C. Specific Cannabis-Related Regulation, Including but Not
Limited to Soft Prohibition Measures
In addition to the application of general laws and regulations to cannabis
activities as the simple consequence of them being legal activities that now
47. See infra Part IV.
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fall within those general laws, there is also an additional layer of regulation
in most states that is targeted specifically at regulating cannabis because it
is cannabis.48 As Paul Larkin, a cannabis policy expert and a Senior Legal
Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation’s Meese Center for Legal and
Judicial Studies’ Institute for Constitutional Government, explains, most
states have used their police power to craft cannabis-specific regulations.49
We already see a large amount of new regulation emerging that is
cannabis-specific — including zoning, planning, permitting, and licensing
systems.50 This Section will survey some of these restrictions and predict
how others may emerge based on examples from other industries.
One purpose of this Section is to further explain the overall regulatory
costs that erect barriers to success for the operation of legal cannabis
markets and that incentivize illicit cannabis markets, the subject of Part IV.
Jeffrey Miron, Director of Economic Studies at the Cato Institute, provides
a useful summary of the issues to get this Part started and to set up Part IV:
One obstacle to moving the marijuana market fully above ground is that
all state legalizations to date — and the regulatory frameworks imposed at
the state or city level — impose substantial restrictions on the marijuana
market. Details vary, but regulations generally limit the number of retail
outlets, the specific products they can sell, the amount customers can
purchase per visit, and the location of stores. Much regulation also
restricts or bans home delivery, bars some individuals from obtaining
retail licenses, and imposes a minimum purchase age of 21. Apart from
this over‐regulation, some states impose a tax burden that prices legal
marijuana well above illegal marijuana.51

Urban planners and other regulators certainly have vast tools in their
arsenal if they wish to use them to regulate and control non-illegal
cannabis. Yet caution is in order. These decisionmakers should be aware
of the potential unintended consequences of their choices, including
potentially propping up the illicit market or working against the goals they
have set to support the change in cannabis’s legal status.
State and local governments operate with an extraordinarily wide
general police power, with broad authority to regulate public health, safety,
morals, and public welfare. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized great

48. See Kochan, supra note 34; see also Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Cannabis Capitalism, 69
BUFF. L. REV. 215, 243–44 (2021).
49. See Larkin, supra note 48, at 243–44 (“No state gives businesses free rein to sell
anything and everything they might generate however they want. States have traditionally
regulated local businesses since the colonial era under their inherent ‘police power.’”).
50. See Kochan, supra note 34, at 48.
51. Jeffrey Miron, How to Kill the Marijuana Black Market, CATO INST. (Aug. 11,
2017), https://www.cato.org/commentary/how-kill-marijuana-black-market [https://perma.
cc/4UUN-48EM].
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might in this “public welfare” standard. Consider, for example, the Court’s
statement in Berman v. Parker that: “The concept of the public welfare is
broad and inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual as well as
physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.”52 As directed at cannabis
operations, the specific health, safety, and welfare concerns associated with
cannabis become the justification for tailored regulations layered on top of
the general regulations discussed in Section III.A.
Among these are special zoning, permitting, and licensing provisions,
and other public land use controls that govern the time, place, and manner
where cannabis-related activity may occur.53 Regulations exist for where,
when, and how cannabis can be sold. Hours and volume limitations are
often placed on dispensaries. In many cities, consumers can buy marijuana
but have very few places to legally smoke it, including because smoking
indoors is often banned, and few jurisdictions allow “pot clubs” to legally
operate.54
These cannabis-specific regulations are similar to targeted regulations
aimed at similar industries and activities. History shows us that special
regulations have been considered justified exercises of the police power to
deal with other “vice”-related or otherwise “on the edge of illegal”
activities. Some regulations, in fact, seem like they are effectually either
hard or soft prohibition. Vanderbilt University Law Professor Robert
Mikos explains that opponents to the relaxation of marijuana laws are
finding ways to make it difficult to take advantage of legalization.55 For
example, “[c]ommunities in at least twelve marijuana legalization states
have already passed local bans on marijuana dispensaries.”56 Mikos notes
that “[e]ven in Colorado, arguably the state with the most liberal marijuana
policies, more than 150 municipalities have passed ordinances banning the
commercial sale of marijuana.”57 Several localities have also enacted
moratoria to get their arms around their regulatory options.58 Some states

52. 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (emphasis added).
53. See Salkin & Kansler, supra note 11, at 3 (describing use of special use permits for
marijuana facilities).
54. See, e.g., Matt Laslo, American High: State-By-State Guide to Legal Pot, ROLLING
STONE (Apr. 19, 2017, 6:14 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culturenews/american-high-state-by-state-guide-to-legal-pot-192704/
[https://perma.cc/6XH5JG5F] (surveying the limitations on places to smoke or consume marijuana even in states
that legalize recreational use).
55. See Mikos, supra note 8, at 720.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Salkin & Kansler, supra note 11, at 3 (describing the number of municipalities
that have enacted moratoria on medical marijuana establishments, explaining that
“[w]henever new and seemingly controversial land uses arrive on the scene, it is not
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allow localities broad discretion to regulate marijuana distribution,
including allowing complete bans on opening dispensaries in a locality.59
And the police power justification is not a hard sell to the courts. Claims
of secondary effects from adult entertainment establishments, for example,
have long been considered by the courts a legitimate reason to target
restrictive land-use regulations at such businesses.60 The Supreme Court
has even rejected certain First Amendment challenges to some regulations
of this kind because of the strength of the local community concerns to
safeguard public health, safety, and morals.61
A host of examples have formed the blueprint for adding a targeted layer
of regulation on top of the generally applicable layer, including liquor
stores;62 bars (and concomitant liquor license supply controls);63 adult
entertainment, bookstores, porn shops;64 massage parlors; strip clubs; and
other similar “vice-laden” or “sinful” lifestyle activities.65 Other examples
include nightclubs, assisted living homes,66 abortion clinics,67 video
arcades,68 and other “disfavored” activities. In a survey of marijuana laws

uncommon for planners and municipal official to enact moratoria to buy some time to study
and develop appropriate regulations”).
59. See Grimes & Massey, supra note 8, at 46.
60. See Thomas B. Griffen, Note, Zoning Away the Evils of Alcohol, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1373, 1395–96 (1988).
61. See id. (citing Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 68–71 (1976)).
62. See Mikos, supra note 8, at 751 (comparing marijuana land use regulations to the
history where “[l]ocal communities have long regulated the sale and even possession of
alcoholic beverages . . . [with] a patchwork of dry, damp, and wet communities in local
option states”); see also Shelley Ross Saxer, “Down With Demon Drink!”: Strategies for
Resolving Liquor Outlet Overconcentration in Urban Areas, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 123,
147–51, 156 (1994) (discussing the “broad and deep” zoning authority to restrict the sale of
alcohol in buildings and on certain lands).
63. See Saxer, supra note 62, at 144–47 (discussing local government requirements for
liquor licenses, often in addition to licensing obtained from the state).
64. See Salkin & Kansler, supra note 11, at 3 (describing use in marijuana land use
decisions of “distance requirements, similar to those used in the regulation of adult business
uses”).
65. See Griffen, supra note 60, at 1396 (discussing cases on use of zoning to exclude
adult entertainment businesses including porno shops and massage parlors).
66. See, e.g., Michael Kling, Note, Zoned Out: Assisted-Living Facilities and Zoning, 10
ELDER L.J. 187 (2002) (explaining the ways that zoning can work to keep out or shrink the
location options for siting assisted living facilities in light of neighborhood opposition).
67. See Griffen, supra note 60, at 1395 (discussing cases on use of zoning to exclude
abortion clinics).
68. See id. at 1396–97 (discussing cases on use of zoning to exclude video arcades,
which courts generally have upheld on the basis that video arcades “have the capability of
producing nuisance-like adverse impacts on surrounding neighborhoods such as litter, noise,
pedestrian traffic, depreciation of neighboring property values, and crime” and because
“video games are said to be addictive, psychologically harmful, conducive to gang activity

536

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIX

across the United States, particularly as they relate to medical marijuana,
University of Colorado Planning Professor Jeremy Németh and his coauthor Eric Ross described emerging marijuana land-use restrictions and
tied them to their historic precursors, with “communities around the
country . . . adopting the same zoning restrictions that prohibit any
businesses selling alcohol, pornography, firearms, and fast food from
locating in residential or even mixed-use neighborhoods” to marijuana
operations.69
Németh and Ross point to examples where “local
jurisdictions are applying the same proximity buffers used to separate sexoriented businesses from residential areas and sensitive uses such as
schools, parks, and playgrounds,” while “also employing density controls
commonly used to control bar and liquor store density, most often the
spacing between such facilities.”70 Furthermore, common law doctrines
like nuisance can be the basis for lawsuits against cannabis operations,
further increasing the costs of doing business. This regulatability by
litigation is also not new to cannabis.71 Cases involving the secondary
adverse effects or secondary nuisances traceable to the liquor store
operation, for example, have seen success.72 And, observers can predict its

and other anti-social behavior, and are said to produce adverse effects on morality and
frugality”).
69. Jeremy Németh & Eric Ross, Planning for Marijuana: The Cannabis Conundrum,
80 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 6 (2014) (“[I]n practice [medical marijuana dispensaries] are
regulated most closely to liquor stores and other nuisance/vice uses.”).
70. Id. (surveying local government marijuana-related land use regulations); see also,
e.g., Salkin & Kansler, supra note 11, at 4–5 (describing Colorado 1,000-foot distance
regulations from previously denied permit locations or a “school; alcohol or drug abuse
treatment facility; principal campus of a seminary, college, or university; or a child care
facility” and more generally surveying local government distance regulations related to
proximity to “churches, drug and alcohol rehabilitation facilities, group homes, halfway
houses, recreational property, and in some instances, any publicly owned or maintained
property” as well as some requiring dispensaries be “a certain distance from smoke shops,
marijuana paraphernalia shops, and other dispensing facilities”).
71. See Salkin & Kansler, supra note 11, at 8 (explaining that some jurisdictions
consider outdoor growing of marijuana a nuisance because of observability as well as
“excess odor, heat, glare, noxious gases, traffic, crime, and other impacts” as well as “repeat
responses . . . by law enforcement personnel to the site, excessive noise, or any distributive
impact created by the cultivation”); see also Mikos, supra note 8, at 764 (surveying the state
laws either authorizing localities to ban retail marijuana sales, denying local governments
that authority, or not yet resolving that issue of authority; but concluding,
“[n]otwithstanding their firm rejection of local authority to ban marijuana shops, all of these
states do allow local authorities to enact some reasonable regulations to govern them”).
72. See Shelley Ross Saxer, License to Sell: Constitutional Protection Against State or
Local Government Regulation of Liquor Licensing, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441, 472
(1995) (“The mere location of a lawful retail liquor store may constitute a nuisance — not
because of illegality, but because of the associated crime problems accompanying such a
land use.”); see also Saxer, supra note 62, at 124 (“Many neighborhood nuisance problems
such as graffiti, loitering, and prostitution, are linked to the sale of alcohol.”).
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application based on the playbook under which other industries like those
above have faced lawsuits.73 Cannabis-related properties should expect to
see the same types of efforts.
On top of targeted regulation and even some regulations that effectively
reach near-prohibition levels, there are also several measures that, by their
motivation, seem to be designed to work as what might be called “soft
prohibition.” In other words, they are regulations based on a community
desire to legalize but not endorse, and thus control, cannabis operations.74
It is like having one bucket of regulations75 that treat cannabis like it is a
legal product and a second bucket (Section III.C here) that treat cannabis as
if it were still illegal or at least highly undesirable. In the latter bucket, the
legal and regulatory framework makes it hard to do that which is
admittedly legal but considered morally or socially undesirable, repugnant,
or at least disfavored.
Licensing and zoning,76 for example, are broad enough authorities that
they give local governments the tools to make it very hard to engage in the
legal cannabis industry inside any particular urban area, city center, or even
their outskirts.77
As Setha M. Low, Professor of Environmental
Psychology and Anthropology and Director of the Public Space Research
Group at the Graduate Center, City University of New York, and Denise
Lawrence-Zúñiga, Professor of Architecture at California State Polytechnic
University, Pomona, explain: “Urban environments provide frequent
opportunities for spatial contests because of their complex structures and
differentiated social entities that collude and compete for control over
material and symbolic resources.”78 The very idea of urban governance

73. See Saxer, supra note 62, at 173 (describing ways to characterize establishments
selling liquor as nuisances per se or nuisance per accidents and cases that did so); see also
Saxer, supra note 72, at 472 (“The sale of intoxicating liquor has been deemed a common
law nuisance by some courts, although many of the decisions involved liquor operations that
were illegal.”).
74. See Németh & Ross, supra note 69, at 3 (identifying NIMBY-based opposition to
marijuana land uses).
75. See supra Section III.A.
76. See Griffen, supra note 60, at 1392–93 (“Freed from the confines of nuisance
theory, the courts rapidly expanded the legitimate objectives of zoning by construing many
novel ordinances . . . . While some judges have objected to this expansion, a municipality’s
power to enact an ordinance in the name of general welfare seems well settled.” (citations
omitted)); see also Salkin & Kansler, supra note 11, at 3 (explaining zoning options — and
the importance of clearly defining terms — for controlling marijuana-related land uses).
77. See James G. Hodge, Jr. & Megan Scanlon, The Legal Anatomy of Product Bans to
Protect the Public’s Health, 23 ANNALS HEALTH L. 20, 33–34 (2014) (stating that
“[a]lthough licensing or zoning may not be used to ban products entirely, they effectively
outlaw them from certain zones to curtail the prevalence” of them).
78. See THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF SPACE AND PLACE: LOCATING CULTURE 19 (Setha M.
Low & Denise Lawrence-Zúñiga eds., 2003).
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consistently includes conflicts over competing preferences for the use and
management of the scarce and valuable resources that constitute the urban
environment. It should not be surprising that drug law relaxation creates
fissures in that urban space that must be carefully navigated.
Location limitations, operational restrictions, and the like have been
used by some local governments to make it nearly impossible to site a
liquor store, for example.79 Mikos again explains that “countless other
communities that otherwise welcome or at least tolerate the marijuana
industry are nonetheless attempting to regulate it, imposing their own
idiosyncratic rules concerning the location, size, hours, signage, security,
goods sold, and taxes paid by local vendors.”80 Hard caps on the number
of facilities can make it very difficult to engage in cannabis commerce.
Florida, for example, allows for only five dispensaries statewide.81
Similarly, Salkin and Kansler identify laws in Colorado, New Mexico,
Maine, and Rhode Island where localities have imposed distance and
visibility regulations for grow sites and dispensing facilities as well as
additional licensing conditions that require extra security measures be taken
by such businesses.82
Indeed, soft prohibition regulations are often designed to increase costs
with the belief that it will also decrease occurrences of the undesirable
activity,83 sometimes failing to recognize that the increased costs will not
diminish activity as much as they think but instead shift much of it to the
black market. Other ways to limit the activity or its success include
signage restrictions84 or requirements to have security guards.85 The
regulators might impose limits on hours,86 location, size, adequate lighting,

79. See Griffen, supra note 60, at 1388 (discussing cases finding wide authority to use
zoning to control liquor stores).
80. Mikos, supra note 8, at 720.
81. See Grimes & Massey, supra note 8, at 47.
82. See Salkin & Kansler, supra note 11, at 4.
83. See Saxer, supra note 62, at 158–59.
84. See Salkin & Kansler, supra note 11, at 6–7 (surveying marijuana advertising and
signage restrictions and the corresponding free speech concerns).
85. See id. (explaining security requirements associated with marijuana land use permits
that resemble the same requirements attached to liquor store permits).
86. See id. at 7 (giving examples of opening and closing hour restrictions for marijuana
facilities); see also Saxer, supra note 62, at 159–60 (describing some of the conditions for
liquor store licenses as including agreements to “remove graffiti promptly, provide adequate
lighting, remove trash, provide a security guard, and in some instances, limit hours of
operation,” along with things like advertising limits and spatial proximity restrictions
between stores and between a store and sensitive areas like schools, parks, churches, and the
like).
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graffiti, or litter removal, etc.87 Hour and day restrictions on the sale of
alcohol are common, for example, often justified by noise, disorderly
conduct, religious concerns, amount of traffic on a specific day, and the
heightened need to control against impaired driving.88 Other innovative
examples of soft prohibition-like regulation targeting past vice-like
activities include setting caps on the number of liquor licenses within a
certain radius, thereby keeping out unwanted activities.89 It is not a stretch
for regulators to make the analogies to liquor and the minimization of
community harm rationale for strong licensing, permitting, and zoning.
Regulations could flow from analogies to the concentration limits
mentioned above, where caps are placed on the overall number of liquor
licenses within a certain area90 based on the belief that such limits help to
control crime and the blight that it is claimed can result if many
“undesirable” establishments like liquor stores are in the same vicinity.91
Other analogies could be made to limiting the manner and location of sale
generally92 and distance or proximity restrictions — such as in relation to
schools, child care and youth facilities, parks, and playgrounds, seminaries,
colleges, and universities, treatment facilities and jails, and residential
areas.93

87. See Salkin & Kansler, supra note 11, at 7 (stating that very much like with liquorbased or adult establishments, several municipalities have “[z]oning ordinances have also
imposed a duty on dispensing facilities to ensure the cleanliness of the neighborhood. Some
localities require dispensing facilities to frequently retrieve litter from around the building
and the surrounding sidewalks. Others ordinances require that graffiti on dispensary facility
walls be removed promptly”); see also Griffen, supra note 60, at 1375–76 (describing Los
Angeles ordinance as an example that dramatically decreased applications to sell liquor by
implementing a comprehensive permitting scheme to combat blight with concentration
restrictions, lighting and security requirements, hours of operation limits, neighbor
notification with public hearings before permit issuance, proximity limitations (to protect
schools, churches, and hospitals), special planning approvals, and other mechanisms).
88. See Saxer, supra note 62, at 170–71.
89. See Kochan, supra note 34, at 49.
90. See Salkin & Kansler, supra note 11, at 5 (discussing limits on the number of
marijuana dispensing facilities in an area); see also Saxer, supra note 62, at 166 (discussing
regulatory strategies “that may help combat liquor store overconcentration” and liquor store
density controls through “limits on the number of outlets that are allowed”); Saxer, supra
note 72, at 443–44 (discussing over-concentration of liquor stores and liquor licensing).
91. See Saxer, supra note 62, at 123 (“Recent studies indicate that there is a ‘high
correlation between the number of liquor stores and a neighborhood’s crime rate.’”); see
also Saxer, supra note 72, at 472–73 (discussing legitimacy of state interests as measured by
loitering, graffiti, and other crime control necessitated by “having a liquor store in the
neighborhood”).
92. See Griffen, supra note 60, at 1374 (“Municipalities have taken aim at the vendors
of alcoholic beverages by passing zoning ordinances that limit the number and type of
establishments permitted to sell liquor.”).
93. See Saxer, supra note 62, at 169–70 (examining regulations that control against
“undue concentration” including placing distance limitations on liquor sales). Borrowing
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***
Each of these categories of regulatory and taxation costs to cannabis
businesses and consumers is uniquely available when the product and
operations are made non-illegal and therefore regulatable. The next Part
considers the potential consequences of those costs and emphasizes why
the regulatability frame becomes so important for evaluating the likelihood
of success at achieving the goals motivating the change in cannabis’s legal
status.
IV. REGULATABILIZATION, ITS INFLUENCE REGARDING ILLICIT
CANNABIS MARKETS, AND AN ACCURATE ASSESSMENT OF THE
POTENTIAL TO REALIZE GAINS FROM NON-ILLEGALITY
Adopting a regulatabilization frame for understanding the shift in
cannabis’s legal status allows urban planners and other policymakers and
observers to make a more honest and accurate assessment of the costs and
benefits of the shift. As part of that assessment, this Part explains why
regulatory costs incentivize continued illicit markets. One goal in this Part
is to help explain the implications that regulatability has on the likelihood
of success of a variety of claimed positive outcomes — claims which, to
varying degrees, rely on assumptions of little or no regulation of cannabis
to reach their conclusions regarding the benefits of eliminating illicitness.
A significant benefit of operating illegally is the absence of regulatory
compliance costs. Moving an illicit activity out of the underground means
it must now face the costs of regulation and begin to internalize those costs.
This puts legal cannabis operations at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis
illicit cannabis operations. Thus, operationally, ending criminal prohibition
should be more robustly understood as not just about eliminating the costs
associated with risk of prosecution but is also about the imposition of
massive new costs from multiple categories of regulation as a result of
becoming a law-abiding business. Multiple layers of regulation will
increase costs, risk stifling innovation, preclude entry, and push some
operations back underground while encouraging others to stay there or
emerge there.

from liquor store regulations, similar distance regulations are emerging for marijuanarelated uses of property. See, e.g., Salkin & Kansler, supra note 11, at 7 (describing zoning
measures being used to control growing and cultivation of marijuana, including location,
size, distance, visibility, and security restrictions); see also, e.g., Mikos, supra note 8, at
731–32 (“[T]o varying degrees communities in Colorado and elsewhere restrict the number,
location, size, and hours of operation of locally permitted marijuana stores.”).
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It cannot be doubted that the regulation of cannabis changes the costs of
doing business.94 And, urban planners and other policymakers must take
better account of these changes. First, decisions must be made on how to
regulate and to what ends. But, equally important, regulators and planners
must better understand the consequences of their regulations. They must
assess the ends of the regulations themselves and whether they can be
successfully attained. Further, they must work especially hard to
understand whether the regulations imposed positively or negatively affect
the policy objectives underlying the decision to change the legal status of
cannabis in the first place.
Consider some of the arguments in favor of legalizing cannabis. Many
involve the gains to be obtained by shifting from illegal markets to legal
ones. Among these are that legal cannabis can be taxed; eliminating the
illicit market will decrease crime and associated urban issues; shifting away
from the illicit market will provide health benefits from safer regulated
products; and police and other municipal resources can be diverted toward
non-cannabis ends when the illicit market disappears. Notice how all of
these are dependent on the assumption that when the legal market emerges,
then the illicit market disappears. If, however, the illicit market remains,
then: (1) illegal cannabis will not be taxed and the existence of the
alternative illicit supply will bring down the amount of legal sales to
subject to taxation; (2) crime and associated negative effects on urban
environments will continue, and it may become even harder to police such
crime because law enforcement will have the extra burden of trying to
distinguish legal from illegal sales and the transaction costs associated with
detangling after that blurring are proving to be quite high; (3) the health
and safety concerns associated with an unregulated supply of differing
quality and perhaps dangerous ingredients will continue as price-sensitive
consumers become willing to take risks with cheaper drugs; and (4) the
savings from diverting police and law enforcement authorities and the
concomitant benefits by redirecting them to other urban and municipal
concerns will not obtain because of the continued, and perhaps more
complicated, need to monitor and contain the continuing illicit cannabis
market.
The benefits of legalization will be realized only if the incentives for
continued or expanded illicit markets are correspondingly limited. As one
raises the costs of doing something legally, it increases the incentives to do
something illegally outside the regulations and controls of the government.
94. See Scott Zamost, Melissa Lee & Jennifer Schlesinger, A Look Inside the Black
Market for Weed Shows the Huge Threat to Legal Businesses, CNBC (July 12, 2019, 7:36
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/11/las-black-market-for-weed-threatens-the-growthof-its-legal-business.html [https://perma.cc/WCM3-GAQ9].
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Consequently, the benefits of legalization must be evaluated against the
limitations to their attainment — and regulatability is a big one — imposed
by legalization itself. In this context, urban planners and others must at the
very least examine those limits that exist within a regulated market that
does not exist for an unregulated market for the sale of goods — because
the absence of those limitations is a competitive advantage to operating in
the illicit market. Illicit markets emerge when regulated markets become
burdensome, and there are opportunities to earn more outside the law rather
than inside it.
Thus, the regulatabilization of cannabis creates rivalrous objectives.
Each regulation designed to achieve positive ends competes with the goals
associated with eliminating an illicit market precisely because regulation
creates incentives to engage in illicit activity.95 As one analysis
summarized the opinions of cannabis experts: “To suppress the black
market, which has no quality controls, safety standards or product testing,
the pricing in the legal market will need to be lower than what is available
in black market channels.”96 And, observers recognize that this rivalry is
playing itself out on the streets.97 As one commentator put it, “many
attentive residents of legalized states know that” the promises of
legalization have not “panned out” because the “[c]annabis’ illegal market
is anything but dying; in some cases, it’s more active than it has been in
years.”98 There is no doubt that a primary goal of the legalization and
decriminalization movements has been to fully integrate cannabis products
and cannabis activity into the legitimate market for goods. But the
continuing existence of the illicit market is almost guaranteed if the
regulatory conditions in the legitimate market incentivize evasion of that
market. Individuals operate in the legal market when the regulatory
climate makes it inviting to do so. Individuals also shift to, or remain,
operating in illicit markets — even for goods where there are legal markets

95. See Allie Howell, Do Marijuana License Fees Help Keep the Black Market Going?,
REASON FOUND. (July 15, 2020), https://reason.org/policy-brief/do-marijuana-license-feeshelp-keep-the-black-market-going/ [https://perma.cc/YU9N-YCT2].
96. Iris Dorbian, NY Legalizes Pot: Will That Squash the State’s Black Market?, FORBES
(Apr. 5, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/irisdorbian/2021/04/05/ny-legalizespot-will-that-squash-the-states-black-market/?sh=1f2815963ddb
[https://perma.cc/PK7FPWX8] (describing opinions of experts, including Charles Gormally, a cannabis attorney at
Roseland, New Jersey-based Brach Eichler and Keith Cich, co-founder and president of
California-based cannabis company Sunderstorm).
97. See Joseph Detrano, Cannabis Black Market Thrives Despite Legalization, RUTGERS
CTR. ALCOHOL & SUBSTANCE USE STUD. (CAS), https://alcoholstudies.rutgers.edu/cannabisblack-market-thrives-despite-legalization/ [https://perma.cc/64H7-A7WE] (last visited Feb.
11, 2022).
98. Id.
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available — when the legitimate market’s regulatory conditions make it the
less attractive and less profitable forum.
Increasingly, news stories are highlighting the continued existence, if not
the enlargement of illicit cannabis markets in jurisdictions where cannabis
has been made legal or decriminalized and where, consequently, as this
Article notes, has become concomitantly regulatabilized.99 Some studies
indicate that the black market, with $70 billion in illegal sales per year
nationally, still dwarfs the seven times smaller legal cannabis market.100
Studies in individual states where the legal status of cannabis has been
relaxed show similar results, with illegal cannabis dominating legal
markets.101 Curiously, some of these studies show that legalization has
increased overall demand for cannabis and even that legal and illegal prices
have both increased,102 but that illicit sellers are getting a bigger share of
those new customers than legal sellers.103
There are huge advantages in the lower costs of doing business in illicit
markets (despite the need to calculate in the potential costs of criminal
liability) to be gained from avoiding regulatory burdens (allowing illicit
sellers to charge a lower price because they do not have to pass these costs
on to the consumers) and offering an untaxed product (which also lowers
prices).104 Consider evidence from California where the so-called “gray
market” companies — meaning the illicit sellers within a jurisdiction that
permits legal sales of the same product — “don’t adhere to the complex

99. See Zamost et al., supra note 94 (“‘The black market is a huge problem,’ said
Patricia Heer, an attorney and founder of Cannabis Law Digest. ‘In some states, it’s between
70% and 80% of sales.’”).
100. See, e.g., id. (“New Frontier Data, a Denver-based company that studies cannabis
trends, estimates there are $70 billion in illegal sales nationally — seven times the size of
the legal market. This means the legal market is ‘capturing only a fraction of total demand,’
the company said in a summary of U.S. cannabis demand trends released this month.”).
101. See Tom Schuba, Billions in Black-Market Weed Still Selling in Illinois 18 Months
After Marijuana Legalized, CHI. SUN-TIMES (June 14, 2021, 7:49 PM),
https://chicago.suntimes.com/cannabis/2021/6/14/22534079/illinois-dispensaries-illegallegal-marijuana-cannabis-pot-bud-sale [https://perma.cc/K5EW-QQD5] (“Even as legal
weed sales in Illinois continue to shatter records nearly 18 months after they kicked off, the
illicit pot trade is still dominating a total statewide market some experts have values at over
$4 billion.”).
102. See id. (describing situations in which the price of illicit weed has increased because
the competitor product, legal weed, has been forced to increase its price and some
consumers expect higher prices).
103. See id.
104. See Detrano, supra note 97 (“[T]here are distinct advantages that local, underground
pot salespeople have over licensed dispensaries. Perhaps the most significant of these
advantages is the possibility for local dealers to sell bud at far lower prices.”).

544

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIX

regulations covering everything from security to product testing.”105 As a
consequence, these unregulated companies “can undersell their law-abiding
counterparts by up to 50%.”106 That gives a substantial competitive edge to
the companies operating outside the law and discourages operating inside
the regulated environment.
The black market will not dissipate unless the legal market is able to
compete by offering lower prices.107 The regulatability-differential makes
that outcome very difficult to imagine. The simple answer to why these
markets thrive is that illicit sellers can offer lower prices, sometimes as
much as 40% lower, because the black market sellers are not paying
permitting fees or taxes.108
It is even more difficult to envision the dissipation of the illicit market
when we consider the price sensitivity of cannabis customers.109 It is a
very basic rule of economics that prices affect demand, because consumers
respond to prices including by forgoing consumption or, more likely, by
seeking alternative products, alternative sellers of the same product, or
more price-friendly alternative markets for the same product when
available.110 In a recent study, research by Reason Foundation policy
experts Geoffrey Lawrence and Spence Purnell reveals that marijuana
customers are price sensitive and will move to the black market if costs get
too high and if the lower price equals the “risk premium” that must be
offered to give up the benefits of buying a legal product.111 Consequently:
“Black markets will continue to operate so long as high taxes in the legal
market create a large price disparity.”112 Indeed, illicit markets not only
offer a lower-priced product, they can also offer consumers other benefits
too. For example, as a CNBC investigative report discovered, black market
105. See Alex Halperin, Can Legal Weed Ever Beat the Black Market?, GUARDIAN (Mar.
18, 2019, 1:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/mar/17/legal-weed-blackmarket-california-gavin-newsom [https://perma.cc/2TKG-ARGD].
106. Id. (citing analysis from Bryce Berryessa, the president of the licensed California
cannabis company La Vida Verde).
107. On black markets generally, see BUTLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 103–04.
108. See Zamost et al., supra note 94 (“Cameron Wald, executive vice president of
Project Cannabis, which owns four stores in LA, said the illegal dispensaries can sell the
same product for nearly 40% less than a legal store. ‘We have outrageous price compression
that we have to see at our stores to compete with people that are not paying their taxes,’ he
said. ‘They’re not paying their permitting fees. They’re not paying the city.’”).
109. See Geoffrey Lawrence & Spence Purnell, Marijuana Taxation and Black Market
Crowd-Out, REASON FOUND. (Jan. 31, 2020), https://reason.org/policy-study/marijuanataxation-and-black-market-crowd-out/ [https://perma.cc/2Q9X-SCBN] (“As demonstrated
by alcohol and cigarettes, excessive taxation can influence consumers’ decisions to
patronize the black market.”).
110. See BUTLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 56–58.
111. See Lawrence & Purnell, supra note 109.
112. Id.
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dispensaries can offer free samples, stay open longer hours, have no sales
caps, etc. — all putting them at a profit-making and competitive advantage
over legal operations.113
Both suppliers and consumers will react rationally when it comes to
choosing between whether to sell or buy in an illicit market versus a legal
one, and will depend on the available profits, costs, and associated risks of
participating in each. Consider Lawrence and Purnell’s assessment of these
concerns. They posit that: “[W]hen a legal market exists, such as in those
states that have passed legalization statutes, producers face a trade-off
between seeking a risk premium for participating in the black market or
facing higher tax expense and regulatory costs in the legal market.” 114 This
tradeoff means that: “All else equal, a producer should be expected to
remain in the black market if their profit margin exceeds the profit margin
that would be available in the legal market plus their required risk premium
for participating in the black market.”115 Consumers do a similar calculus,
where they “should be expected to remain in the black market only if the
cost savings available from lower prices on that market exceed the
consumer’s risk premium for participating in it.”116 It is a given that most
people like to operate within the law, but incentives matter. While
consumers prefer to buy legal drugs, they will move to illegal suppliers
when pricing and quality conditions push them there. If the consumers do
not believe they are getting substantial benefits from buying at a higher
legal price, then they will move to the illicit market. There is a breaking
point. Consequently, while “[m]ost consumers prefer, other things equal,
to purchase from legal suppliers,”117 urban planners and policymakers
should recognize that their policies regularly will have unintended
consequences. Black markets emerge when poorly designed public laws
and policies encourage them, meaning they “arise only when government
policy forces markets underground by outlawing them or by imposing
excessive regulation or taxation.”118 It is really just a matter of
competition. Competitors do not emerge unless they have something to
offer that will pull them away from existing suppliers. When existing
suppliers add costs, there will be incentives for alternative suppliers to
emerge — whether they are operating inside or outside the law. If the way
to offer a cheaper product is to do it illegally, then so be it. Entrepreneurs
regularly seek to overtake incumbents, and there is nothing that says an

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See Zamost et al., supra note 94.
See Lawrence & Purnell, supra note 109.
See id.
See id.
Miron, supra note 51.
Id.
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entrepreneur is only the one who operates inside the law. Sometimes the
entrepreneurial aspect of the competitor’s enterprise is its very illicitness,
the thing that allows it to escape costs that attach uniquely to the
entrepreneur’s competitor who is seeking to operate inside the law.
Achieving the promises of legalization becomes complicated when so
many of them depend on the elimination of the illicit market. Indeed, the
high costs of compliance and the competitive disadvantages when an illicit
market continues to be an available substitute make the incentives to enter
the less-profitable legal market much lower than many expected.119 As one
reporter notes: “One big reason to legalize cannabis is to wrest the market
away from criminal enterprises and tax the proceeds. But in Canada and
the US [sic] states where weed is legal, the illegal market has proven to be
a tenacious competitor — and it’s likely to remain so for years.”120 The
persistence of the illicit market follows from the costs associated with
operating in a legal market and ensures that the desired regulatory
structures are far less effective because they will not apply to the entire
market, legal and illicit, for marijuana.
The expected tax revenue from legalization is also far lower than
expected because black market sales are keeping legal sales down. When
some stay in the black market, that means there are fewer entrants in the
legal market. Furthermore, attractive lower-cost purchasing opportunities
in the untaxed illicit market means that less product is being sold in the
taxed market.121 Consequently, urban planners and other policymakers
cannot count on this additional revenue to serve the budget offset or new
expenditure expectations that they anticipated when advocating in favor of
legal cannabis — in part a miscalculation because there was not a full
appreciation for the fact that this was not really just legalization but instead,
making a product legal and regulatable. As Lawrence and Purnell observe:
“Many view marijuana legalization as a potential windfall for state budgets.
Accordingly, states have sought to identify tax rates, licensing rates and
other fees that extract the maximum revenue from the industry to fund
unrelated government projects ranging from education to infrastructure
improvement.”122 Yet, the authors continue in their next sentence by
making the critical point of stone-cold realism that “by raising the price of
marijuana for consumers” through the imposition of regulations and taxes,
“these costs undermine a major competing purpose of legalization:

119. See Zamost et al., supra note 94 (“Many saw legalization of marijuana as a huge
economic opportunity, but the reality is its potential isn’t fully realized. An underground
economy is cutting into the profits of legal businesses.”).
120. Halperin, supra note 105.
121. See Zamost et al., supra note 94.
122. Lawrence & Purnell, supra note 109.
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elimination of the black market.”123 The revenue generation does not flow
if the channels toward legal sales also do not flow because of an alternative
product stream from illicit paths.
Indeed, the continuation of an illicit market actually creates new burdens
for law enforcement, urban planners, and local regulators because the new
mix of both legal and illegal cannabis operations adds the need to devote
resources to distinguishing between the two and effectively punishing
illegal operations if the legal operations are to be protected. Indeed, the
punishment or deterrence of illegal operations is one of the critical
prerequisites to an efficiently operating legal market. Without it, there is
little reason to operate in the light instead of the shadows.124 So, advocates
of legal cannabis cannot abandon the effort to police illegal operations lest
they risk giving up the whole game.
But these new monitoring costs further tax urban budgets and push the
realization of revenue savings or revenue generation away from local
governments’ reach. The need to distinguish legal versus illegal operations
is a new transaction cost of legalization. Before that, it was easy.
Everyone involved in cannabis cultivation, sales, and distribution was a
criminal. Now, the authorities need to be able to determine who is who and
what is what. Thus, there are new dual costs of monitoring and policing
legal operations to make sure they are complying with regulations and
paying taxes while also monitoring and policing illegal operations to
punish and deter as well as to create incentives to operate in the legal
market. We sometimes forget that legal markets operate efficiently only
when the authorities provide them protection against illegal market
competitors. Tons of new inquiries must be made — for example, which
dispensaries or cultivators have permits and which do not; which
possessors are holding legal products versus illegal product; which grow
operations are in full compliance with environmental laws and which are
scofflaws; which products are adulterated and which are consistent with
health and safety guidelines; and which operations are following labor
laws, supply limits, hours of operation constraints, selling to minors,
reporting sales for taxes, and so on.125

123. Id.
124. See generally id. (recognizing that the risk of getting caught and the possibility of
suffering criminal sanctions is felt and operates as a real constraint on illicit behavior, but
the level of constraint is directly proportional to the risk of getting caught and the weighing
of the costs versus the gains from engaging in the illicit activity, discounted by the
probability of imposition of penalties).
125. See, e.g., Differentiating Legal vs. Illegal Cannabis Products, CANNGEN INS. SERVS.
(July 20, 2022), https://www.canngenins.com/differentiating-legal-vs-illegal-cannabisproducts/ [https://perma.cc/EW38-R88A]; Legal vs. Illegal Cannabis, HARRISBRICKEN (Oct.
15, 2015), https://harrisbricken.com/cannalawblog/legal-vs-illegal-cannabis/ [https://
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Just as regulatory compliance costs are not neutral with legalization, it is
a similar fantasy to believe that enforcement costs are neutral or capable of
realizing savings. Enforcement costs will exist for the whole new layer of
regulations. And, as noted here, additional enforcement costs will be
created when an industry moves from entirely illegal to legal but with an
inevitable continuation of an illegal side market.126
And it is not just regulators that will have a hard time distinguishing
legal versus illegal markets. Consumers have this problem too, adding
another layer of complication when it comes to urban officials and other
policymakers trying to safeguard the health of consumers who cannot be
trusted to know or simply do not have adequate tools or education to know
what products are or are not better for them. Urban planners already
struggle with finding ways to improve health literacy, especially among
poor and minorities in their communities given that social determinants like
these affect the level of health literacy amongst those groups.127 Planning
for health literacy should focus on “development of skills and capacities
intended to enable people to exert greater control over their health and the
factors that shape health.”128 When it comes to cannabis consumption
decisions, many of these consumers are already underinformed because
they have never faced the need to choose between illegal or legal cannabis
before when the only option was to get it on the streets.
It is often unclear to customers which operations are legal and which are
not, creating difficulties in achieving the urban goal of channeling
customers to legal, safer outlets and adding an administrative burden for
law enforcement who must expend extra resources to distinguish between
operations.129 In fact, the sheer mass of illegal operations — including

perma.cc/P5JL-V7U6]; Legal vs. Illegal Dispensaries: What to Look For, CANNGEN INS.
SERVS. (July 17, 2020), https://www.canngenins.com/legal-vs-illegal-dispensaries-what-tolook-for/ [https://perma.cc/G6NC-WLSA].
126. See Detrano, supra note 97 (describing substantial continued enforcement costs in
California due to illegal farms, operations, smuggling, and other illegal activities).
127. See generally Deborah Chinn, Critical Health Literacy: A Review and Critical
Analysis, 73 SOC. SCI. & MED. 60 (2011); Mary Evelyn Northridge & Lance Freeman,
Urban Planning and Health Equity, 88 J. URB. HEALTH 582 (2011) (describing health and
health literacy inequalities and the need to account for them in urban planning); Health
Literacy, HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV, https://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/topics-objectives
/topic/social-determinants-health/interventions-resources/health-literacy
[https://perma.cc/5UG9-25HT] (last visited Jan. 26, 2022) (explaining that “health literacy”
is “the degree to which individuals have the capacity to obtain . . . basic health
information”).
128. Don Nutbeam, The Evolving Concept of Health Literacy, 67 SOC. SCI. & MED. 2072,
2072 (2008); see also Kristine Sørensen, Health Literacy: A Key Attribute for Urban
Settings, in OPTIMIZING HEALTH LITERACY FOR IMPROVED CLINICAL PRACTICES 1 (Vassilios
E. Papalois & Maria Theodosopoulou eds., 2018).
129. See Halperin, supra note 105.
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easier-to-identify-as-illegal pure street sales as well as those that look legal,
i.e., are operating as if they are part of the legal market but that have not
received requisite approvals — blurs the market for consumers who have
significant transaction costs associated with identifying legal operations
compared to illegal ones, especially with illegal operations often
masquerading as legal and taking advantage of consumer ignorance.130
Furthermore, one of the conditions motivating consumers to prefer a
legal market may very well break down in the cannabis space. Once you
have blending of a legal market and illicit market for the same product, the
product itself may be virtually indistinguishable to both private
enforcement authorities and public enforcement authorities. In other
words, police, landlords, or employers may not be able to tell if you are
possessing or smoking a product that originated from a legal or an illegal
grower or distributor. If it becomes almost impossible to police, or at least
to police the end users of the product, while at the same time the existence
of a legal market makes the taboo go away, then the end users may no
longer be deterred from obtaining the product on the illicit market in the
first place. Couple this with the fact that this same group who is no longer
as strongly deterred from buying illegally also consists of price sensitive
consumers. That price sensitive group may feel very little shame from
buying from the illicit sellers, even if they can determine whether the seller
is legitimate or illicit as an original matter. It may no longer matter.
Thus, local authorities, in many ways, have a more complicated, greater
burden than before legalization. Of course, if budgets for these dual roles
do not increase, then legalization and concomitant regulation of legal
cannabis actually dilutes enforcement resources by spreading them thin and
makes urban authorities worse at each task — controlling legal and
policing illegal operations — when forced to do both at the same time
without increased resources.131 And, if both cannot be done well, it means
success at achieving the goals of each suffers, with crossover effects.132
While a primary point of legalization was to eliminate the costs associated
with policing a black market, the persistence of the black market means
those benefits are not being realized. When the benefits are greater to act
outside the legal controls or the illegal market than they are to act inside,
the incentives to innovate illicitly emerge. The less effective control over
the illegal market makes the illegal markets even more robust, further
detracting from the benefits of operating in the legal markets and further

130. See Detrano, supra note 97.
131. See Zamost et al., supra note 94.
132. See id.
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pushing the infinitely regressive cycle toward a continuing illicit market
which diminishes benefits of legalization and on and on.
It is encouraging that some commentators are beginning to recognize
that one of the unintended consequences of taxing legal cannabis is to
channel operations and consumption into a continuing illicit drug
market.133 But the focus is too often myopic when there is a vast
regulatory field built into the price of legal cannabis. The vast majority of
research and press on the issue of price effects is focused on this issue of
taxation, without understanding the much broader regulatory overlay that
also impacts price. Thus, while it is helpful that this recognition of price
effects exists, the fact that the commentary and research associated with
pricing effects and illicit markets after cannabis legalization is almost
universally related to the effects of direct taxation means that the picture
surrounding the drivers behind the continued illicit market is incomplete.
Indeed, it is so laser focused that it seems like most observers and
commentators are entirely blind to the taxation-like effects of the broader
regulatory thicket in which legal cannabis is entangled but through which
illicit cannabis need not pass. Understanding the impacts associated with
the regulatory layer that is imposed on any once-illegal now-legal activity
— and how that layer creates a fundamentally different market for the sale
of goods than existed when the cultivation, distribution, sales, and use of
those goods were illegal — is critical. Such comprehension of the interplay
between regulation and market prices helps illuminate the shape of both the
legal cannabis market and the contours, features, and drivers of an enduring
yet transformed illicit market for cannabis that now competes with the legal
market.
This recognition itself should be a useful, eye-opening exercise for any
urban planner or other policymaker. It is the regulatabilization of cannabis
that policymakers and communities are dealing with and not just simple
legalization. Understanding this fact, decisionmakers can better predict the
consequences of the change in legal status and better calculate the
anticipated costs and benefits not just of status changes but better assess
which kinds of regulations they wish to impose on cannabis-related activity
and in what manner. Furthermore, researchers must do better at calculating
the regulatory burden in the cannabis market beyond taxes. For example,
some researchers like Lawrence and Purnell advise policymakers that they
should set taxes at rates sensitive to avoid incentives for consumers to seek
lower prices in the black market.134 The same advice applies to setting

133. See, e.g., Lawrence & Purnell, supra note 109.
134. See id.; see also Dorbian, supra note 96 (explaining claim that need to ease in
taxation to push out black market).
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non-tax regulatory burdens as well because those operating costs similarly
push legal cannabis prices up and increase the attractiveness of illicit
markets.
CONCLUSION
The way an issue is framed can affect how it is evaluated. And omitted
features of a frame too can deprive the observer of the opportunity to
appreciate key aspects of the content. This Article has contended that the
current frame for the shift in status to make cannabis activities and products
not illegal has been imprecisely and incompletely framed as a legalization
or decriminalization move to the detriment of our ability to understand and
forecast the effects of the move. The legal move involves far more than
flipping a switch turning illegality off and legality on. When the legality
light shines into the cannabis room, complex webs of regulatory structures
are revealed in the room.
The regulatabilization frame better captures the true nature of the
emerging cannabis law regime and creates an emphasis on regulation that
urban planners and other policymakers cannot ignore. Without such
emphasis framing, there is a risk that the consequences of a regulatory
overlay will go underappreciated and the resulting policy choices will be
under informed. Separate and apart from the re-framing proposal, this
Article, at the very least, has presented an economic understanding of the
effects of regulation on price and the corresponding effects on illicit,
shadow markets as an alternative to the formal cannabis markets. The
regulatabilization frame helps us see the consequence more clearly. The
existence of complex and high-cost regulations necessarily changes the
legal cannabis business outcomes and consequently incentivizes the
continuation of the illicit market. Without addressing the incentives
driving the continuation, indeed emboldenment, of the illicit cannabis
market in many states today, the purported benefits of making cannabis not
illegal cannot be optimally realized. However, if policymakers better
understand these effects, they will be better equipped to navigate so as to
minimize their occurrence.

